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Criminal EvidEnCE and Human rigHts: rEimagining 
Common law ProCEdural traditions, by Paul roberts 
and Jill Hunter (eds) 1
Mike Madden 2
rECEnt ExPEriEnCEs in Canada and a variety of common law jurisdictions 
clearly demonstrate how difficult it can be to integrate rapidly emerging—and 
sometimes expanding—conceptions of human rights into more traditional 
bodies of evidence law and criminal procedure. For instance, the question of 
whether a testifying complainant’s right to exercise her freedom of religion by 
wearing a niqab on the witness stand prevails over an accused’s right to make 
a full answer and defence through unobstructed cross-examination of the 
complainant was recently considered by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) in 
R v NS.3 Whose rights prevail in circumstances such as this? Is there a principled 
basis within either the law of evidence or criminal procedure that can be relied 
upon when human rights claims are raised during a criminal trial?4 In Criminal 
Evidence and Human Rights, the editors have assembled a very worthwhile 
collection of essays that, as a whole, provides readers with insight into how 
these kinds of important, politically charged questions are being confronted 
throughout the common law world. The book ultimately leaves readers with an 
1. (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2012) 409 pages [Roberts & Hunter, eds, Criminal Evidence].
2. Lieutenant-Commander, CD, Royal Canadian Navy. B.A., M.A., LL.B., and J.S.D. 
(candidate) at Dalhousie University’s Schulich School of Law.
3. 2012 SCC 72, 353 DLR (4th) 577 [NS], aff’g 2010 ONCA 670, 102 OR (3d) 161.
4. In NS, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada refused to lay down a rule that would 
always subordinate one right to another. Instead, the majority indicated that a witness’s right to 
freely exercise her religion by wearing a niqab on the witness stand would yield to a defendant’s 
right to a fair trial where removal of the niqab would be required in order to prevent a serious 
risk to the fairness of the trial; alternative measures could not prevent the risk; and the benefits 
would outweigh the harms of ordering that the niqab be removed (see ibid).
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understanding of the universality of the struggle to implement lofty and abstract 
human rights as a means of securing fair criminal trials.
It should be noted at the outset that no single theme or argument unifies the 
essays in Criminal Evidence and Human Rights, nor perhaps could one reasonably 
expect such unity from a compilation that draws on the jurisprudence of South 
Africa, Malaysia, Canada, Scotland, Ireland, Hong Kong, New Zealand, and the 
European Court of Human Rights, in addition to less jurisdictionally specific 
legal theory. In fact, the editors explicitly acknowledge in their introduction that, 
apart from inviting contributors to address the core topic, editorial instructions to 
authors were “sparse and non-prescriptive.”5 Nonetheless, readers will inevitably 
perceive a few common themes that run throughout the collection of essays, as I 
will explain below.
The editors suggest in their introduction that the book’s essays can be grouped 
into five broad categories: “(a) human rights in constitutional criminal procedure; 
(b) improperly obtained evidence; (c) human rights and criminal proof; (d) 
hearsay and confrontation; and, (e) fair trials for all.”6 Although the sixteen essays 
that follow the introduction are simply presented as sequential chapters, they are 
clearly organized into groups dealing with each of these five topics. In some cases, 
(specifically, the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence and hearsay and 
confrontation law) the topical organization is quite useful since the respective essays 
deal with essentially the same narrow legal issues, albeit from different theoretical 
and jurisdictional perspectives. In addressing the other three (much broader) 
topics, however, the issues discussed by the contributors are so discrete that there 
really is not much substance connecting the essays within each group. Thus, 
while it is recognized that edited collections must be organized in some logical 
way, one should perhaps avoid any attempts to fit the essays in Criminal Evidence 
and Human Rights into watertight compartments. For instance, if readers are 
interested in confrontation and cross-examination law, they might find as much 
value in Peter Duff’s account of the largely ineffective body of Scottish law 
designed to protect sexual offence complainants from unnecessarily harrowing 
cross-examination (the book’s final essay, presumably within the “fair trials for 
5. Paul Roberts & Jill Hunter, “Introduction—The Human Rights Revolution in Criminal 
Evidence and Procedure,” in Roberts & Hunter, eds, Criminal Evidence, supra note 1, 1 at 6.
6. Ibid at 7.
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all” category)7 as they do in two of the earlier essays that are more explicitly 
dedicated to “hearsay and confrontation.”8
The collection’s real contribution to a recently reinvigorated body of literature 
dealing with theories of evidence and human rights law (and with the practical 
implementation of these subjects within the realm of criminal procedure) is 
at a higher level of abstraction than one can see when only looking at narrow 
legal issues from individual jurisdictions. Criminal Evidence and Human Rights 
follows a series of influential works published in these fields over the last ten years. 
Larry Laudan’s Truth, Error, and Criminal Law: An Essay in Legal Epistemology9 
perhaps marked the beginning of a new academic conversation about evidence 
law by criticizing, from an epistemological perspective, many common law rules 
of evidence that purport to aid fact-finders in finding truth. Published shortly 
thereafter, Alex Stein’s Foundations of Evidence Law10 argues against many of the 
epistemic claims raised by scholars like Laudan and suggests that the primary 
purpose of evidence law is to apportion risk in conditions of uncertainty, rather 
than to aid in finding truth. Hock Lai Ho’s A Philosophy of Evidence Law: Justice 
in the Search for Truth11 takes evidentiary theory one step closer to the domain 
of human rights law by suggesting that evidence law, and the criminal process 
more generally, must communicate respect and concern for criminal defendants 
in addition to fulfilling its other instrumentalist functions. Finally, between 2004 
and 2007 Antony Duff, Lindsay Farmer, Sarah Marshall, and Victor Tadros 
published a three-volume series on fair trial theory12 in an attempt to explain how 
fair criminal trials must function if they are to achieve their purposes.
All of the above works consider at least some questions regarding the 
appropriate function of evidence law (as an epistemic or rights-protectionist 
tool), the necessary components of a fair trial, the perspective(s) from which fair-
ness is measured, and the best ways in which human rights law can be integrated 
7. “Human Rights, Cosmopolitanism and the Scottish ‘Rape Shield’” in Roberts & Hunter, 
eds, Criminal Evidence, supra note 1, 369.
8. See Mike Redmayne, “Confronting Confrontation” in Roberts & Hunter, eds, Criminal 
Evidence, supra note 1, 283; Chris Gallavin, “Reliability, Hearsay and the Right to a Fair Trial 
in New Zealand” in (ibid), 327.
9. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
10. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
11. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) [Ho, Philosophy of Evidence].
12. The Trial on Trial: Truth and Due Process, vol 1 (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2004); 
The Trial on Trial: Judgment and Calling to Account, vol 2 (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 
2006); The Trial on Trial: Towards a Normative Theory of the Criminal Trial, vol 3 (Portland, 
OR: Hart Publishing, 2007).
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with evidence law in criminal proceedings—questions that are again picked up 
and advanced through analysis of specific problems in specific jurisdictions in 
Criminal Evidence and Human Rights. In other words, Roberts and Hunter’s 
collection of essays is significant not so much in its contribution to our 
knowledge about any of the five broad topics that it purports to consider, 
but rather in its ability to relate discussions from within these topics to larger 
philosophical questions about the nature of the relationship between human 
rights on the one hand, and more established evidence law and criminal 
procedure on the other hand.
Some specific examples from Criminal Evidence and Human Rights might 
help to illustrate how many of the essays tend to address common issues in 
evidence law and human rights theory. For instance, the question of whose rights 
must be considered when determining the content of a right to a fair trial arises 
in several different essays. In discussing South Africa’s constitutional exclusionary 
rule, P.J. Schwikkard notes that “fairness to the prosecution may well be a factor to 
be taken into account in determining whether the admission of evidence would 
‘otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice,’”13 and he suggests that 
a form of balancing takes place between the rights of the public and the accused 
in South African exclusionary decisions.14 John Jackson makes the same point in 
his essay dealing with Ireland’s constitutional exclusionary rule.15 He asks, “What 
about the need to protect the constitutional rights of persons other than the 
accused in non-life-threatening situations?”16 To answer this question he refers 
to the “public interest,”17 concluding that “[t]he strict exclusionary approach 
towards evidence obtained in breach of the accused’s constitutional rights adopted 
by the Irish courts appears to overcompensate.”18 In his essay about the privilege 
against self-incrimination, however, Andrew L-T Choo points out problems with 
jurisprudence that attempts to balance all the rights and interests at stake in a 
proceeding.19 Choo argues that even though a state (and the public) may have 
13. “A Constitutional Revolution in South African Criminal Procedure?” in Roberts & Hunter, 
eds, Criminal Evidence, supra note 1, 25 at 50 [emphasis added] [citation omitted].
14. Ibid at 50-52.
15. “Human Rights, Constitutional Law and Exclusionary Safeguards in Ireland” in Roberts & 
Hunter, eds, Criminal Evidence, supra note 1, 119.
16. Ibid at 135.
17. Ibid at 143.
18. Ibid.
19. “‘Give Us What You Have’—Information, Compulsion, and the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination as a Human Right” in Roberts & Hunter, eds, Criminal Evidence, supra 
note 1, 239.
BOOK REVIEWS 1075
a strong interest in regulating highway driving, there is a danger in accepting 
laws that compel vehicle owners potentially to incriminate themselves: “[A] right 
might lose its symbolic significance, and in time actually become devalued, if it 
can simply be ‘balanced away’ on an apparently ad hoc basis.”20
As these essays—drawn from three different sections of Criminal Evidence 
and Human Rights—all demonstrate, both criminal procedure and evidence law 
throughout the common law world are now frequently forced to address the 
ways in which they can and should accommodate the rights of victims, witnesses, 
and the general public alongside the rights of accused persons in criminal trials. 
More importantly, the essays focus attention on a significant shift or counter-
trend in thinking about any human right to a fair trial: Accused persons in many 
jurisdictions are now yielding their place as primary holders or beneficiaries of 
such a right, as courts begin to emphasize the more global perspective from which 
fairness in criminal proceedings is to be measured.
Many other essays take up the debate about whether evidence law is an 
epistemic (or instrumentalist) tool designed to find truth or a more 
communicative (non-instrumentalist) component of a criminal trial. For 
instance, David Hamer’s essay dealing with delayed complaint cases builds 
upon Stein’s previous work on evidence law theory and echoes his dominant 
argument that evidence law is really all about allocating risk in conditions of 
uncertainty.21 Thus, in addition to briefly debunking non-epistemic arguments 
about the unfairness to an accused person of delayed complaint trials, Hamer 
marshals epistemic theory in order to demonstrate how “[t]he epistemic 
claim that the loss of evidence [over long periods of time] disproportionately 
disadvantages the defendant is illogical. Since the evidence is lost, its content 
is simply unknown.”22 In other words, Hamer’s epistemic conception of the 
law of evidence, or of the criminal trial more generally, would suggest that 
there is nothing unfair about delayed complaint trials. Hock Lai Ho’s essay,23 
however, showcases a dramatically different point of view. Just as Ho had 
previously described evidence law as a means of demonstrating respect and 
concern for an accused, rather than simply as a means to extract truth from 
witnesses,24 in “The Presumption of Innocence as a Human Right,” he again 
20. Ibid at 251.
21. “Delayed Complaint, Lost Evidence and Fair Trial: Epistemic and Non-Epistemic Concerns” 
in Roberts & Hunter, eds, Criminal Evidence, supra note 1, 215; Stein, supra note 10.
22. Supra note 21 at 236.
23. “The Presumption of Innocence as a Human Right” in Roberts & Hunter, eds, Criminal 
Evidence, supra note 1, 259 [Ho, “The Presumption”].
24. Philosophy of Evidence, supra note 11.
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espouses a non-instrumentalist view of evidence law and criminal procedure. Ho, 
in his discussion of a Singaporean politician’s public statements (which tended 
to imply that an individual was perhaps guilty even after being acquitted at 
trial), suggests that “the trial is not strictly speaking a factual inquiry [and] ... 
[t]he presumption of innocence is not an epistemic rule but a normative 
principle, a central pillar of the rule of law that puts protective distance between 
government and citizens.”25 Ultimately, Ho’s belief that evidence law requires us to 
be “duly respectful of [a defendant’s] personal dignity”26 and to treat the accused as a 
subject, not merely an object, of criminal proceedings,27 leads him to argue for a 
very strong and uncompromised right to be presumed innocent.
These examples all demonstrate that regardless of whether one analyzes the 
rights to make a full answer and defence, to confront witnesses, or to be presumed 
innocent, discussions about evidence law and human rights will necessarily be 
influenced by one’s view of the epistemic or non-epistemic basis of evidence law. 
In other words, Criminal Evidence and Human Rights, while providing readers 
with useful discussions about specific legal problems throughout the common 
law world, also forces us to ask ourselves foundational questions about the roles 
and functions of evidence law and criminal trials—questions that continue to 
generate controversy among leading scholars.28
Another trend that can be identified from various contributions to 
Criminal Evidence and Human Rights is the growing recognition (also recently 
identified and explained elsewhere29) that evidence and human rights law are 
becoming more internationalized—that is to say, they are becoming increasingly 
similar throughout the common and civil law worlds as mutual influence 
and cross-pollination take place across jurisdictions. To a certain extent, this 
recognition is reflected in the entire collection of essays in Criminal Evidence 
and Human Rights, which draws from an extremely broad range of common law 
jurisdictions. However, even within individual essays, one sees substantial resort 
to comparative methodologies. For instance, in suggesting that a suspect’s right 
to have counsel present during interrogations has reached a global (common 
law) tipping point, Christine Boyle and Emma Cunliffe essentially argue that 
25. “The Presumption,” supra note 23 at 273.
26. Ibid at 277.
27. Ibid.
28. See e.g. Laudan, supra note 9; Stein, supra note 10; Ho, Philosophy of Evidence, supra note 11; 
Duff et al, eds, supra note 12.
29. See generally John D Jackson & Sarah J Summers, The Internationalisation of Criminal 
Evidence: Beyond the Common Law and Civil Law Traditions (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012).
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Canada should recognize a similar right in order to conform with the 
international majority.30 Chris Gallavin, in critiquing New Zealand’s approach 
to dealing with hearsay evidence, surveys comparable rules created in Canada, 
England and Wales, Australia, the United States, and the European Court of 
Human Rights, before concluding that New Zealand would benefit from 
development towards the Canadian, US and European variants of hearsay rules 
and exceptions.31
In short, this collection of essays helps us to realize how similar evidence 
law has become in the common law world, if not in substance then, at least, 
in terms of the core dilemmas faced by courts in applying the law. Further, it 
highlights the fact that “comparative study may yield other insights when it 
operates from standpoints of commonality.”32 This realization is important for 
comparative scholars, since it might weaken long-entrenched perceptions about the 
fundamental differences that supposedly exist among the criminal procedure 
rules of common law, civil law, and other legal systems.
It would be difficult to identify any major criticisms of Criminal Evidence and 
Human Rights. Certainly, some essays, such as Mike Redmayne’s “Confronting 
Confrontation”—which concludes with remarks about how “epistemically-based 
trial rights are often poor candidates for becoming the sort of human rights that 
are enshrined in legal documents enforceable at the supra-national level”33— 
integrate discussion about wider evidence law and human rights themes into 
their content, and this type of insight is helpful to scholars in the field. However, 
even the more descriptive, less analytical essays (such as Simon N.M. 
Young’s “Human Rights in Hong Kong Criminal Trials”34) add real value to 
the collection, if only because they provide much-needed commentary and 
information about legal developments in common law jurisdictions that are 
often overlooked by Western scholars.
In Canada, we continue to debate the relative value that should be ascribed 
to the rights of victims, witnesses, accused persons, and other stakeholders 
in criminal trials. And this debate is sure to reignite with full force in both 
academic and popular discourse in the wake of the SCC’s decision in NS.35 
30. “Right to Counsel During Custodial Interrogation in Canada: Not Keeping Up with the 
Common Law Joneses” in Roberts & Hunter, eds, Criminal Evidence, supra note 1, 79.
31. Gallavin, supra note 8.
32. Craig R Callen, “Human Deliberation in Fact-Finding and Human Rights in the Law of 
Evidence” in Roberts & Hunter, eds, Criminal Evidence, supra note 1, 309 at 310-11.
33. Redmayne, supra note 8 at 307.
34. Roberts & Hunter, eds, Criminal Evidence, supra note 1, 55.
35. Supra note 3.
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Criminal Evidence and Human Rights offers Canadian readers valuable exposure 
to the theory and practice of criminal procedure throughout the common law 
world, where similar questions about the recognition of human rights in criminal 
trials are being confronted. The book could, however, just as easily be picked 
up and appreciated by scholars in other common law or (in recognition of 
the increasing internationalization of evidence law) civil law jurisdictions, 
regardless of whether readers are interested in criminal procedure, evidence law, 
constitutional law, or human rights law. Criminal Evidence and Human Rights 
advances many of the major debates that are currently taking place in these fields 
and is, therefore, a worthwhile read for anyone who seeks to participate in or to 
influence these important conversations.
